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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
versely affected and upon alternative means of protecting that interest.
Thus, mandatory-directory analysis may result in broader compliance
with procedural rules than would be demanded by due process.
Given the facts of Humble Oil & Refining Co., a mandatory-
directory analysis would have probably yielded the same results reached
by the court through due process analysis. The advantage of the man-
datory-directory analysis would have been a more precise articulation
of the specific circumstances under which compliance with procedural
rules is required. The disadvantage of the approach used by the court
is that a cautious, overlybroad interpretation of the scope of the pro-
cedural compliance standard may well lead to the exaltation of form
over substance.
3 7
On balance, this decision makes a significant contribution to the
development of administrative law for municipal and county agencies
in North Carolina. The dramatic increase in ithe number of cases
adjudicated by administrative agencies38 accentuates the importance
of assuring procedural fairness for parties who appear before quasi-
judicial tribunals. The sensitivity demonstrated by the court toward
the protection of procedural fairness, if tempered with recognition of
the uniquely flexible and informal nature of administrative actions by
local governmental agencies, should lead to constructive resolution of
issues not definitively decided by this case.
WENDELL HARRELL OTT
Constitutional Law-Double Jeopardy in the Juvenile Courts
The right to be free from double jeopardy, as guaranteed by the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution,1 is an integral part of
the Anglo-American system of justice. "Fear and abhorrence of govern-
37. Similarly, if an agency finds the burden of a rigid and overly-broad procedural
compliance standard excessively onerous, a not unlikely reaction would be to delete by
amendment the provision in question whenever the provision was not a minimum re-
quirement of due process. The imposition of rigid standards designed to enhance pro-
cedural protection of applicants could thus ironically lead to minimum rather than max-
imum procedural protection.
38. See Hanft, Some Aspects of Evidence In Adjudications By Administrative
Agencies in North Carolina, 49 N.C.L. REv. 635, 638-39 (1971).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... .
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mental power to try people twice for the same conduct is one of the
oldest ideas found in western civilization."2 The United States Supreme
Court recognized the fundamental nature of this right in Benton v.
Maryland,3 a 1969 decision which made the fifth amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy applicable to state criminal prosecutions
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Breed
v. Jones4 the Supreme Court was presented with the question whether
the prosecution of an individual in an adult criminal tribunal after an
adjudicatory proceeding in juvenile court was violative of the double
jeopardy prohibition.5 A unanimous Court6 held that the guarantee
against double jeopardy is violated in such a case.7 By so holding, the
Court continued its pattern of selectively incorporating procedural rights
and assured another safeguard for youths in state juvenile court sys-
tems.8
On February 9, 1971, the State of California filed a petition in the
juvenile court for the County of Los Angeles alleging that respondent
Gary S. Jones, a seventeen-year-old minor, had committed an act that, if
performed by an adult, would have been in violation of the California
robbery statute.' The petition further alleged that Jones was therefore a
person described by California Welfare and Institutions Code section
60210 and was thus within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. At a
subsequent adjudicatory or jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court
found that Jones had committed the robbery and that he was a person
described by section 602.11 At a dispositional hearing12 held on March
2. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
3. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
4. 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975).
5. Id. at 1781.
6. Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion for the Court.
7. 95 S. Ct. at 1791.
8. Those constitutional and procedural safeguards already guaranteed by the
Court are the right to notice, the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination,
the right to confrontation and cross-examination, and the right to a standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. See text accompanying notes 32-48 infra.
9. 95 S. Ct. at 1781.
10. When the petition was filed, California Welfare and Institutions Code section
602 (West 1966) provided:
Any person under the age of 21 years who violates any law of this State or
of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this State de-
fining crime or who, after having been found by the juvenile court to be a
person described by Section 601, fails to obey any lawful order of the juvenile
court, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such
person to be a ward of the court.
(A 1971 amendment lowered the jurisdictional age from twenty-one to eighteen. Ch.
1748, § 66, 1971 Cal. Stats. 3766.)
11. 95 S. Ct. at 1782.
12. At the time of the filing of the petition, CAL. WhLF. & INsT'NS CODE § 702
(West Supp. 1968) set out the procedure for the dispositional hearing.
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15, 'the juvenile court judge found that Jones was not amenable to the
rehabilitative facilities of the juvenile court' 3 and that he would recom-
mend prosecution of Jones as an adult. 4 At the next hearing the court
certified Jones to be tried as an adult.15
Jones then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in juvenile court,
contending that the adjudication under section 602 and the subsequent
transfer to superior court placed him in double jeopardy. His petition
was rejected. 6 Habeas corpus relief was likewise denied by the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal.' The California Supreme Court denied Jones'
petition for a hearing.' 8 Jones was then tried in superior court and was
found guilty of robbery in the first degree.' 9
-In December 1971, Jones, through his mother as guardian ad
litem, filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California, reasserting his claim of
double jeopardy.20 The district court refused to accept Jones' conten-
tion that jeopardy attached at his adjudicatory hearing and denied his
petition.21 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding
that jeopardy did attach at the adjudicatory hearing and that a juvenile
who is the subject of a hearing in which jeopardy has attached cannot be
retried as a minor or an adult "absent some exception to the double
jeopardy protection. 2 2
The Supreme Court affirmed,28 stating that for the purpose of
protection against double jeopardy, the adjudicatory proceeding is essen-
tially a criminal prosecution2 4 and that jeopardy attaches when the trier
of fact has begun to hear evidence. 25 The Court refused to accept a
claim that, because respondent was subject to the risk of only one pun-
13. At the time, id. § 707 (West Supp. 1967) allowed the juvenile judge to find that
the youth was not a "fit and proper subject to be dealt with" in juvenile court and to
prescribe criminal prosecution.
14. Jones v. Breed, 497 F.2d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1974).
15. 95 S. Ct. at 1783.
16. 497 F.2d at 1163.
17. In re Gary Steven J., 17 Cal. App. 3d 704, 95 Cal. Rptr. 185 (Ct. App. 1971).
18. 95 S. Ct. at 1783.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1783-84.
21. Jones v. Breed, 343 F. Supp. 690, 692 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
22. 497 F.2d at 1168. In so holding, the Court relied heavily on Fain v. Duff, 488
F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2396 (1975), in which the Fifth Circuit
became the first court to hold that juveniles in state court systems were constitutionally
entitled to the double jeopardy protection.
23.- 95 S. Ct. at 1791.
24. Id. at 1786.
25. Id. at 1787.
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ishment, a trial in superior court would not violate the double jeopardy
clause26 and also rejected a "continuing jeopardy" argument.2r The
Court recognized that their decision would mean that, in most cases,
a state must insure that a transfer decision be made prior to the adjudi-
catory hearing.28 It concluded, however, that assuring juveniles the con-
stitutional safeguard against double jeopardy would aid rather than hin-
der the system and would further the objective "that to the extent fun-
damental fairness permits, adjudicatory hearings be informal and non-
adversary. 29
The standard of fundamental fairness as applied to the juvenile
courts has its origins in Kent v. United Statesf0 In that case the Supreme
Court held that a District of Columbia juvenile statute must be interpret-
ed as encompassing certain constitutional rights and that the adjudica-
tory hearing must "measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment."'31 Kent was a portent of the landmark decision in In re
Gault.32 In that case the Court held that fundamental fairness" requires
that each alleged delinquent be entitled to the following procedural
guarantees at his adjudicatory hearing: (1) the right to notice of the
26. Id. "For, even accepting petitioner's premise that respondent 'never faced the
risk of more than one punishment,' we have pointed out that 'the Double Jeopardy
Clause ... is written in terms of potential or risk of trial and conviction, not
punishment."' Id., citing Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970).
27. 95 S. Ct. at 1788. The concept of "continuing jeopardy" has "never been
adopted by a majority of the Court." Id., citing United States v. Jenkins, 95 S. Ct. 1006,
1013 (1975).
28. 95 S. Ct. at 1789. The Court reasoned that such a requirement would be
helpful, as it would eliminate a dilemma in which many youths find themselves. The
problem arises in this context: if a transfer is allowed after the adjudicatory hearing, the
youth who has cooperated has already given the prosecution his testimony and defenses
before trial in the adult tribunal. On the other hand, a youth who is uncooperative may
face both an unfavorable adjudication and dispositional recommendation within the
juvenile court system. Id. at 1791.
29. Id. at 1791.
30. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The Court first dealt with denial of due process to
minors in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), though the juvenile court system was not
involved. The Court reversed the murder conviction of a fifteen-year-old because of a
violation of due process in obtaining his confession. The defendant's age prompted the
Court to take "special care in scrutinizing the record," for the juvenile cannot be
expected to react in the same fashion as would a mature adult. Id. at 599. Fourteen years
later, the Court used its Haley rationale in reversing the murder conviction of a fourteen-
year-old in Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
31. 383 U.S. at 562. "Fundamental fairness," a term quoted with approval by the
Court in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970), is used interchangeably with the
phrase "due process and fair treatment."
32. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
33. Actually the phrase "due process and fair treatment" was employed. Id. at 30.
See note 31 supra.
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charges against him as well as timely written notice of the hearing,3 4 (2)
the right to counsel, 5 (3) the privilege against self-incrimination,3" and
(4) the right to confrontation and cross-examination.
3 7
Gault was a response to an idealistic "civil" juvenile court scheme
that was initiated at the turn of the century1 to dispense "personalized"
justice in a manner similar to a parent administering guidance to his
child.39 Gault acknowledged that the system had fallen short of its stated
goal,4" noting in particular the high crime rate among juveniles,41 the
the high incidence of recidivism,42 and "[d]epartures from established
principles of due process [which] frequently resulted not in enlightened
procedure, but in arbitrariness. '43 In fact, the "civir' nature of the
proceedings had previously been asserted as the rationale for denying
constitutional and procedural rights guaranteed to adult criminal de-
fendants,44 including freedom from double jeopardy.45
A fifth procedural right was later guaranteed to juveniles in In re
34. 387 U.S. at 33-34.
35. Id. at 41.
36. Id. at 55.
37. Id. at 56-57.
38. Illinois, in 1899, was the first state to adopt a new system of courts exclusively
for juveniles. ILL. LJws 1899, §§ 1-21. At that time, the Chicago Bar Association
reported that
[Tihe fundamental ideal of the Juvenile Court law is that the state must step
in and exercise guardianship over a child found under such adverse social or
individual conditions as to develop crime... It proposes a plan whereby
he may be treated not as a criminal or one legally charged with crime, but
as a ward of the state ....
Nicholas, History, Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile Courts, 1 J. FA~MLY L. 151
(1961).
39. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function
and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 9-10. This approach is summed up in the latin phrase,
parens patriae, a concept that has its roots in the medieval English chancery courts. See
Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens Patriae," 22 S.C.L. Rv.
147 (1970).
40. A 1967 presidential study came to the same conclusion. See PREsIDENT's
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, TAsK FORCE
REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YoUTH CRIME, 7-9 (1967).
41. 387 U.S. at 20 n.26.
42. Id. at 22.
43. Id. at 18-19.
44. See, e.g., In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924); In re Magnuson, 110
Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952); In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205,
183 P.2d 282 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Wissenburg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W.
205 (1929); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932), appeal dismissed, 289
U.S. 709 (1933) (per curiam); Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 88 P. 609 (1907).
45. People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (Dist. Ct. App.
1953); Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M.
140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); In re Smith, 114 N.Y.S.2d 763 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1952); State v.
Smith, 75 N.D. 29, 25 N.W.2d 270 (1946).
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Winship40 when the Court held47 that children are constitutionally
entitled to the standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" in delin-
quency hearings. 48 However, the trend toward full constitutional rights
for juveniles stopped with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,49 in which the
Court stated that there is no right to trial by jury in juvenile proceed-
ings.
50
In assuring the sixth right to those in the juvenile court system, 1
the Breed Court engaged in a two-step analysis. It first considered
whether the juvenile proceeding could be differentiated from a criminal
prosecution for the purpose of the safeguard against double jeopardy.5 2
Concluding that it could not,53 the Court then examined whether the
assurance of the right to be free from double jeopardy so diminished the
juvenile court's "assumed ability to function in a unique manner"' that
the right should not be incorporated.55 Dealing with the problem in this
fashion, the Court utilized the same analytical process employed in
Gault, Winship, and McKeiver. In Gault and Winship, the Court char-
acterized the juvenile court proceedings as criminal for the purpose of
each right in question 56 and determined that the incorporation of each
46. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
47. Id. at 368. The Court first had to incorporate explicitly this safeguard for
adults though "it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a
reasonable doubt is constitutionally required." Id. at 362, 364.
48. The Court first faced this issue in In re Whittington, 391 U.S. 341 (1968) (per
curiam), but never reached the merits of the case and remanded to the state court for
reconsideration in light of Gault. In DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969) (per
curiam), the Court similarly declined to rule on the question, finding that resolution of
the issue would not be appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
49. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
50. See note 58 and accompanying text infra. The right to jury trial question had
been previously raised in In re Whittington, 391 U.S. 341 (1968) (per curiam), and
DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969) (per curiam), but the Court refused to rule
on the issue in Whittington, for it never reached the merits of the case. See note 48
supra. DeBacker was held to be an inappropriate case for a resolution of the jury trial
issue because the adjudicatory hearing had taken place prior to the effective date of
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which held the right of jury trial applicable
to the states.
51. It might be argued that the Court did not fully incorporate the right. See text
accompanying notes 59-65 infra.
52. 95 S. Ct. at 1785-87.
53. Id. at 1786. In so finding, the Court reiterated the conclusion reached in Gault
that the juvenile is subject to substantially the same loss of liberty as an adult and also
faces similar societal stigma. Since the juvenile encounters the same "potential conse-
quences" as does the adult accused, he suffers the same "heavy pressures and burdens
... "Id.
54. Id. at 1787, citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 547.
55. 95 S. Ct. at 1787-91.
56. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-67 (right to standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 35-36 (right to counsel); id. at 49-50
(privilege against self-incrimination); id. at 56 (right to confrontation and cross-
examination). Gault did not discuss similarities in the juvenile and criminal court
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right would not interfere with the functioning of the system in the
desired manner. 5r The right to trial by jury was denied in McKeiver
when the Court found that the possible advantages were outweighed by
the fact that such a guarantee might "remake the juvenile proceeding
into a fully adversary process and [would] put an effective end to what
[had] been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective
proceeding.
'.8
The Court's mode of analysis in Breed was therefore consistent
with previous cases. However, one way in which Breed might differ
from those prior cases is the way the Court appeared to anticipate
situations in which fundamental fairness would not require the protec-
tion against double jeopardy that they enunciated. The holding in Breed
is limited to those situations in which a juvenile is prosecuted in trial
court after an adjudicatory hearing in juvenile court.59 The holding,
coupled with the following language from the case, gives the impression
that there may be some situations in which the right to be free from
double jeopardy may give way to the desired operation of the juvenile
court system:
If there is to be an exception to that proteotion in the context of
the juvenile court system, it must be justified by interests of society,
reflected in that unique institution, or of juveniles themselves, of
sufficient substance to render tolerable the costs and burdens
...which the exception will entail in individual cases.60
There are three basic situations in juvenile proceedings that might
involve the issue of double jeopardy. 1 Breed is an example of one
situation: the prosecution of a minor in a criminal trial for the same acts
that already were examined in an adjudicatory juvenile hearing. Another
possibility is waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court after the start of
processes in analyzing the right to notice, as the standard for a constitutionally adequate
notice is the same in a civil or criminal proceeding. Id. at 33.
57. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 366-67 (right to standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 32-33 (right to notice); id. at 35, 38 n.65
(right to counsel); id. at 51-52 (privilege against self-incrimination); id. at 56-57 (right
to confrontation and cross-examination).
58. 403 U.S. at 545. The Court gave a total of thirteen reasons for its decision. Id.
at 545-51. The rationale of McKeiver has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Note,
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: A Retreat in Juvenile Justice, 38 BROOVLYN L. REV. 650
(1972); Note, When Is a Criminal Trial Not a Criminal Trial?-The Case Against Jury
Trials in Juvenile Court, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 126 (1971).
59. 95 S. Ct. at 1791.
60. Id. at 1788.
61. See Rudstein, Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings, 14 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 266, 278-311 (1972).
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an adjudicatory hearing and a subsequent transfer to criminal court."2
Finally, a minor's acts might be the subject of a second adjudicatory
hearing in juvenile court, if the first hearing was terminated in some
manner favorable to the accused. 8
In light of Breed's position as to the moment jeopardy attaches, the
first two situations are now functionally the same for the purpose of
double jeopardy determinations. Because jeopardy is said to attach when
the juvenile court begins to hear evidence,"4 it does not appear to matter
whether the adjudicatory hearing reaches a conclusion before the case is
transferred; if evidence is heard, that would seem to be enough to
prevent a second episode in criminal court.
As to a second adjudicatory hearing after a favorable termination,
logic as well as fundamental fairness dictates that this second juvenile
hearing not be permitted. If the original adjudicatory hearing puts a
youth in jeopardy, so should the second. No court faced with this factual
situation since the Gault decision has allowed a second hearing."" Thus,
despite the possibility of an "exception," there does not seem to be a
context in which one could arise.
Breed is therefore analytically consistent with the approach taken
by the Supreme Court in selectively incorporating rights for youths in
the juvenile court system. Rather than merely granting juveniles all of
the rights already guaranteed to adults accused of crime, the Court has
considered each safeguard separately and has determined (through the
two-step analysis) whether the states will be required to furnish that
safeguard. Although this technique has been cited as particularly suited
for the setting of juvenile justice,"6 each time the Court guarantees
another right, the inconsistency of the entire approach is further empha-
sized. Justice Black, concurring in Gault, saw the illogic of first stating
that a youth in juvenile court faces the same risk as does an adult, and
then denying the juvenile the same constitutional and procedural guar-
antees that the adult enjoys: "[it would be a plain denial of equal
protection of the laws-an invidious discrimination-to hold that others
subject to heavier punishments could, because they are children, be
62. Nearly all jurisdictions permit this procedure. Id. at 297.
63. See, e.g., Richard M. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 752 (1971).
64. 95 S. Ct. at 1787.
65. Rudstein, supra note 61, at 279.
66. See Dorsen and Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, FAMILY
L.Q., vol. 1, no. 4, 11-12 (Dec. 1967).
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denied these same constitutional safeguards."6 7 As each right is consid-
ered by the Court and the juvenile process is said to be indistinguishable
from a criminal trial for the purpose of that right, the methodology of
selective incorporation in the context of the juvenile court system be-
comes increasingly difficult to justify.
CHARLES B. WAYNE
Constitutional Law-The Decline of Male Chauvinism?
The Supreme Court once stated that woman is destined for an
inferior role in the societal scheme of things, that she is properly placed
in a class by herself, and that the law of the Creator deems that she
perform the duties of wife and mother and no other.' In the years
since, the Supreme Court has softened its "romantic paternalism"
toward the "weaker" sex and now views woman essentially as man's
equal.' This evolution has not been without its difficulties, however,
and even the current Supreme Court stance on sex discrimination is
obscure. The principal difficulties seem to be the determination of the
standard3 with which to judge the discrimination in such cases and a
determination of how stringently that standard will be applied.
Stanton v. Stanton4 is the most recent Supreme Court exposition
on sex discrimination and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.5 In an almost unanimous decision6 the Court held that a
Utah statute which fixed the age of majority at eighteen for girls and
67. 387 U.S. at 61 (Black, J., concurring). The same arguments were made by the
dissenters in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 557-63.
1. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1872).
2. This evolutionary change is examined in Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971
Term-Foreword. In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Hnv. L. REv. 1 (1972). See also Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. Rav. 1065 (1969); Note, Constitu-
tional Law: The Equal Protection Clause and Women's Rights, 19 Loy. L. RaV. 542
(1973); Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical
Approach, 58 VA. L. REV. 1489 (1972).
3. See text accompanying notes 14-25 infra.
4. 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975).
5. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1. This section is the principal vehicle used by
litigants to challenge statutes that allegedly discriminate against females on the basis of
sex.
6. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented.
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